fix(security): optional SSRF egress guard for probes and webhooks - #49
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Address the SSRF finding: an authenticated user can point a probe or webhook at internal services or the cloud metadata endpoint. A monitoring tool legitimately reaches internal hosts, so this is an opt-in guard (`SSRF_BLOCK_PRIVATE`, default off) for multi-tenant deployments. - app/core/security/ssrf.py: `assert_target_allowed(host)` resolves the host (DNS, so a name mapping to an internal IP is caught) and, when the guard is on, rejects loopback / RFC1918 / link-local (incl. 169.254.169.254) / reserved / multicast. - All probe types (HTTP/TCP/SSL/PING/SNMP) and webhook delivery, plus the SNMP poller, check the target first; the HTTP probe also stops auto-following redirects when the guard is on (so a 30x can't bounce to an internal address). - Default off → single-user self-hosted monitoring of internal hosts is unchanged. Tests: internal-IP classification, the toggle (off allows, on blocks internal / allows public), and HTTP-probe + webhook blocking when enabled. Full suite 235 passed; ruff + mypy(strict) green.
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Pentest remediation — finding #1 (SSRF). Opt-in (
SSRF_BLOCK_PRIVATE, default off,since monitoring legitimately reaches internal hosts).
assert_target_allowed(host)resolves DNS and, when enabled, blocks loopback /RFC1918 / link-local (incl. cloud metadata 169.254.169.254) / reserved / multicast.
delivery; the HTTP probe also disables redirect-following when the guard is on.
Tests: IP classification, the toggle, and HTTP/webhook blocking. Full suite 235
passed; ruff + mypy(strict) green.